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Abstract 
This paper explores the merits of macro- and micro-based tax rate measures 
within an open economy ‘fiscal policy and growth’ model. Using annual data 
for 15 OECD countries we find statistically small, non-robust long-run growth 
effects of macro-based average tax rates on capital income and consumption, 
but some evidence for average labor income tax effects. Changes in ‘micro’ 
marginal income tax rates at both the personal and corporate levels yield 
statistically robust GDP responses of modest size. Both domestic and foreign 
corporate taxes appear relevant. In general, tax effects on GDP operate largely 
via factor productivity rather than factor accumulation. 
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1. Introduction 
The empirical literature testing for the effects of taxes on long-run growth have 
generally been motivated by two foundational endogenous growth models. The 
first, Barro (1990) established a so-called ‘inverted-U’ relationship between 
steady-state growth and income tax rates in a model in which a ‘distortionary’ 
proportional tax on (capital and labor) income and a ‘non-distortionary’ 
consumption tax financed a mixture of utility-enhancing and private production-
enhancing public expenditures. 
Secondly, focusing more on the tax side of the government budget, a suite of 
related models by Devereux and Love (1994, 1995), Roubini and Milesi-Ferretti 
(1994a, b), Mendoza, Milesi-Ferretti and Asea (1997), and Milesi-Ferretti and 
Roubini (1998) established steady-state growth effects of labor and capital income 
and consumption taxes in endogenous growth models with physical and human 
capital. These papers demonstrated that whether – and how much – each of those 
taxes affect long-run growth depends on how ‘leisure’ is specified in individuals’ 
utility functions, and the ‘technology’ of human capital production.1 The key 
public finance characteristics of these models are that growth effects depend on 
the form of taxation, the type of public expenditure that is tax-financed and the 
‘technology’ of goods and human capital production. 
These models have subsequently proved popular as a basis for empirical 
testing. In the case of the Barro model this partly reflects the convenience of the 
‘distortionary/non-distortionary’ tax and ‘productive/non-productive’ expenditure 
distinctions for identifying empirical proxies; see, for example, Kneller et al. 
(1999), Bleaney et al. (2001), Adam and Bevan (2005), Arnold (2008) and 
Gemmell et al. (2011). In addition, Mendoza, Milesi-Ferretti and Asea (1997) – 
1 
hereafter MMA (1997) – suggested a convenient method for estimating tax rates 
on capital and labor income and consumption, suitable for testing their models on 
macro data. Following Mendoza, Razin and Tezar (MRT, 1994), they proposed a 
method of calculating macro-level effective tax rates based on estimates of tax 
revenues and tax bases. Subsequently known as ‘MRT tax rates’, a variety of 
methodological modifications have been suggested
2
 and have been used to 
examine tax-growth effects by, for example, Angelopoulos, et al. (2007), and 
Romero-Ávila and Strauch (2008).
3
 
As well as providing a testable theoretical model MMA (1997) provided 
evidence in support of ‘Harberger’s superneutrality conjecture’ that “although 
theory predicts that changes in tax rates affect investment and growth in the long-
run, in practice tax policy is an ineffective instrument to influence growth” 
(MMA, p.99). Using their constructed MTR tax rates for an OECD country panel 
of 5-yearly averaged data, they found modest effects of capital and labor income 
taxes on investment (a 10 percentage point reduction in tax rates generating a 12% 
increase in investment). However, they found negligible effects on GDP growth a 
statistically insignificant 0.1-0.2% increase in GDP growth rates from the same 
tax reductions.
4
 
Subsequent research on the tax-growth relationship in OECD countries, such as 
the studies cited above, has tended to find more evidence of adverse effects of 
various taxes on growth.
5
 These subsequent studies have used a variety of tax rates, 
calculated using different methods, usually applied to annual or period-averaged data 
and, in some cases, yielding non-robust results for tax-growth effects. 
2 
It therefore remains unclear how far this evidence overturns, or confirms, the 
original MMA (1997) conclusion that tax policy is largely incidental for long-run 
GDP growth rates. In particular, criticisms leveled at the current evidence include: 
1. The potential endogeneity of tax rates calculated from tax revenues – both MRT 
tax rates and the ‘implicit’ average tax rates obtained from revenue/GDP ratios. 
2. Both these are average tax rates. While traditional models of labor supply, and 
more recent models of foreign direct investment (FDI), suggest roles for both 
average and marginal tax rates, most theoretical macro tax-growth models focus 
on marginal effects, though generally from models with proportional taxes, where 
average and marginal rates are equal (Li and Sarte, 2005, is an exception). 
3. The empirical literatures on FDI and innovation have focused on the impacts of 
corporate or personal tax rates (with potential effects on GDP) rather than the 
capital/labor distinction of much of the macro tax-growth literature. 
4. Recent tax-growth models such as Peretto (2003, 2007), and empirical studies by 
Lee and Gordon (2005), and Arnold et al. (2011), have proposed or examined tax 
effect on GDP transmitted via innovation and entrepreneurship effects on multi-
factor productivity instead of, or as well as, via investment. 
This paper addresses each of those aspects. We explore GDP responses to both 
aggregate average and micro-level marginal tax rates using both capital/labor and 
personal/corporate distinctions, and we examine how far estimated tax-growth 
effects are transmitted via investment or productivity. In addition, we examine the 
implications of theoretical open-economy growth models, such as Roubini and 
Milesi-Ferretti (RMF, 1994b), for tests of GDP responses to capital tax rates; in 
particular focusing on the role of international tax competition and 
capital/technology flows. 
3 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the 
relevant tax-growth theory including open-economy growth aspects. Section 3 
discusses the choice of suitable tax rates and other issues that arise when ‘taking 
theory to the data’. Section 4 first presents some evidence on the various tax rates 
for our sample of OECD countries, then discusses our regression results. Section 5 
concludes. 
2. Taxes and Growth in Closed and Open Economies: Theory 
This section summarizes the main elements of the closed economy MMA 
(1997) endogenous growth model, as extended to incorporate foreign investment, 
following RMF (1994b). Since the former model at least is well-known, we only 
sketch its main components here. 
MMA (1997) set out a model in which a composite good, Y, and human capital, 
H, are each produced from inputs of human and physical capital, K, using CRS 
technology. Thus: 
Y = 𝐴(𝑣K)𝛼(𝑢H)1−𝛼 (1) 
and H ̇ = B[(1 − 𝑣)K]𝛽(𝑧H)1−𝛽 − SH (2) 
where 1-v (z) is the share of physical (human) capital devoted to human capital 
accumulation, and u is the share of human capital used in goods production. 
Both types of capital depreciate at rate , and physical capital accumulates 
according to: 
K̇ =Y−SK−C−G (3) 
where C is consumption and G is government expenditure (= tax revenues net of any 
transfers).
6
 Each individual’s time endowment is normalized to unity, with (1 – z – u) 
the fraction of leisure time. Individuals maximize their lifetime utility based 
4 
on a CES instantaneous utility function having consumption, C, and leisure, l, as 
arguments. 
MMA (1997) solve the first order conditions for this problem to obtain the 
balanced growth equilibrium. This uses the familiar ‘fundamental growth 
equation’: 
𝛾  =  𝜃 ( 𝑟  −  𝜌 )  =  1  
1 𝜃 ((1 − 𝜏𝐾)𝑅𝐾 − 𝛿 − 𝜌) (4) 
in which the equilibrium growth rate of consumption, y, is the difference 
between the rate of time preference, p, and the net after-tax rate of return on 
capital, r, adjusted by the inverse of the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution 
in consumption, B. Also, in (4) 𝜏𝐾 is the rate of capital income tax, and RK is the 
pretax rate of return. It is useful to note three further conditions (in (5) to (7) 
below) used to derive the semi-reduced form expression for the growth rate in 
(8): These are:
7 
 
𝑟 = (1 − 𝜏𝐾)𝛼𝐴 
(𝑣𝐾  𝛼−1 − 𝛿 (5)  
𝑟  =  ( 1  −  𝛽 ) 𝐵  ( ( 1 − 𝑣 ) 𝐾   
𝛽  
𝑧𝐻 ) (𝑢 + 𝑧) − 𝛿 (6) 
𝑢 𝛼 1 − 𝛽 (1−𝜏 𝐾 1 − 𝑣 (7) 
= 
𝑣 1−𝛼 𝛽 (1− 
1 
Hence: 𝛾 = 𝜃 
{[𝐷 (1 −𝜏𝐾)𝛼𝛽 (1 −𝜏𝐻)(1−𝛼)𝛽 (𝑢 + 𝑧)1−𝛼]1−𝛼+𝛽 − 𝜌 − 𝛿} (8) 
where D is a function of the production function parameters A, B, a and fl. Together 
(5) – (8) demonstrate both the direct effect of both TK and TH on growth (as shown in 
(8)) and the indirect effects - through (u + z) in (8), and operating through the 
5 
1 
factor ratios, vK/uH and (1-v)K/zH (as seen in (5), (6) and (7)). Though the 
consumption tax rate, TC, does not appear explicitly in (5) – (8), MMA show that 
zC affects the value of (𝑢 + 𝑧) to the extent that there are labor supply effects. 
However, as RMF (1994a) demonstrate, if leisure is ‘quality time’ or it represents 
‘home production’ (both of which embody human capital), or if labor supply is 
inelastic (𝜖 = 0), the term in (u + z) drops out of (6) and (8) and there are no 
indirect growth effects from changes in zC. 
RMF (1994b) extend this model to capture small open economy aspects by 
allowing (a) perfect international mobility of capital, but immobile human capital; 
and (b) the government to fund its expenditures from bond issues and taxation of 
foreign assets (based on the residence principle) at rate, z". The economy takes the 
world interest rate, r
*
, as given, and domestic bonds and foreign assets are perfect 
substitutes. Thus net of tax rates of return are equated, introducing an additional 
expression for r in equilibrium growth: 
𝑟= 𝑟*(1 − 𝜏𝐹) . (9) 
It follows from the definitions of r in (4) and (9), that in equilibrium the interest 
rate on bonds, r, must equal the net-of-tax return on capital and the net-of-tax 
return on foreign assets. Further, from (9), it is not possible to set z", zK, and zH 
independently in equilibrium since: 
𝜏𝐹 = 1 − 𝑟* 𝑟 (10) 
where, from (4) and (8), r is equal to: 
1 
𝑟 = [𝐷(1 − 𝜏𝐾)𝛼𝛽(1 − 𝜏𝐻)(1−𝛼)𝛽 (𝑢 + 𝑧)1− 1−𝛼+𝛽− 𝛿 (11) 
Therefore, tax rates 𝛼] on foreign and domestic assets, and human capital, are 
positively correlated. Other things equal, a rise in zK, for example, will reduce the net-
of-tax return on domestic investment and require an increase in z" to avoid arbitrage 
opportunities leading to an outflow of capital.
8
 As Rebelo (1992) notes, 
6 
this residence-based (or ‘worldwide’) tax system in it’s pure form implies capital tax 
rates determined by max(zK, zF), where credits are given for any foreign taxes up to 
the value of domestic tax liabilities.
9
 In such a system, the growth effects of 
domestic taxes continue to apply.
10
 However, in the RMF (1994b) model, the 
introduction of a territorial tax system (as operates in some EU countries, Australia, 
New Zealand), in which foreign income is exempt from domestic taxation, implies 
that all capital locates abroad in equilibrium when zK > zF, and vice versa for zK < zF. 
Hence steady state growth is unaffected by changes in tax rates in this case (and 
there are no transitional dynamics). 
In practice, most countries’ tax systems for foreign capital income are neither 
pure ‘residential’ nor ‘territorial’ systems, and often differentiate between capital 
income earned under personal and corporate tax codes. As a result, in most 
countries zF is determined by a combination of tax rates set domestically and set 
abroad, depending for example on treatment of non-domestic assets, the use of 
withholding taxes, availability of foreign tax credits, whether tax is levied on 
accrual or on repatriation, etc. Hence setting of zF in conjunction with domestic tax 
rates as described above may not be straightforward, even where the objective is to 
set those rates to maximize growth in equilibrium. 
A limitation of each of the models described above is that government 
expenditure affects neither utility nor goods productions. The Barro model does this. 
It omits a human capital production process, and labor supply is exogenous, but adds 
‘productive’ government spending, G, to the production function (effectively 
replacing uH in (1)), with an income tax at rate zY funding total public spending: 
hence zY = G/Y.
11
 There are constant returns to total ‘public plus private capital’ 
(though public expenditure is a flow rather than a capital ‘stock’), and firms 
7 
take government productive spending as given in making their decisions. Hence 
the fundamental growth equation (4) above becomes: 
𝛾  =  𝜃  { 𝛼 𝐴 ( 1  −  𝜏 𝑌 ) 𝑔 ( 1 − 𝛼 )  −  𝛿  −  𝜌 }  =  1  
1 𝜃 {𝛼𝐴(1 − 𝜏𝑌)(𝜏𝑌)1−𝛼 − 𝛿 − 𝜌} (12) 
where g = G/Y, and {𝛼𝐴(1 − 𝜏𝑌)𝑔(1−𝛼) − 𝛿} in (12) is the net-of-depreciation, after-
tax return on capital. Here income taxes can be seen to have non-linear effects on 
growth, due to the combined effect of reductions in investment, via (1 − 𝜏𝑌), and 
increased investment via the positive externality effect of government spending: 
(𝜏𝑌)
1
−𝛼. An important aspect of (12) for empirical testing is that, where 
government productive expenditure is controlled for, tax effects on long-run 
growth are expected to be negative, whereas if government expenditure is not 
controlled for, a non-linear, inverted-U relationship is expected. 
The relationship between steady-state growth and the various tax rates can readily 
be illustrated for a set of parameter values in the above equations. Rather than 
simulate a particular economy, parameter values have been chosen to yield sensible 
values for real long-run growth rates (around 2-3%) at income tax rates around 0.2 to 
0.4.
12
 Using fairly standard values for key parameters, such as elasticities for 
production functions, rates of substitution, time preference etc (see Appendix 1), 
Figure 1A simulates the relationship between growth and tax rates K, H, and Y, using 
equation (8) or (12). The Figure shows that, as capital and labor tax rates are raised in 
the MMA model, growth rates decline. Unsurprisingly, the rate of decline is greatest 
when both capital and labor rates increase, and is least when only labor income tax 
rates increase. This latter effect depends, of course, on the respective magnitudes of 
the assumed responses of capital and labor to tax rate changes. The profile shown for 
the Barro model reveals the inverted-U pattern with 
8 
the adverse growth effects of income taxes dominating in this case at rates in 
excess of around 0.25. 
Using (10) and (11) above, Figure 1B shows the relationship between domestic 
and foreign tax rates in the open economy extension to the MMA model. Many 
combinations of the three tax rates are of course possible and compatible with 
equilibrium, but illustrative simulations set TK = TH. The broken line represents the 
45
o
 line where TF = TK = TH, with the unbroken line showing the equilibrium values 
of TF for each TK (= TH). This particular set of parameter values implies TF > TK for 
TK less than around 0.15, but TF < TK at higher domestic tax rates. That is, raising 
the tax rate on domestic (capital and labor) income increasingly requires a lower 
tax rate on foreign capital income if investment is not to be attracted abroad by 
higher real returns. (The three tax rates approach equality again as domestic rates 
are raised further towards 1.0).
13
 Conversely, if foreign capital tax rates are falling 
exogenously (e.g. because foreign corporate rates are declining and domestic firms’ 
foreign investment income is not fully taxed at a higher domestic rate) then 
domestic tax rates will also have to fall to maintain equilibrium growth. 
3. Taking Theory to the Data 
The models described in section 2 identify circumstances in which empirical 
investigations could be expected to identify a negative correlation between long-
run growth rates and a combination of domestic taxes on capital and labor income, 
foreign income and, possibly consumption. However, they are silent on a number 
of other empirically important aspects. 
3.1 Average versus marginal effects 
9 
All those models treat tax systems as proportional so that marginal and average 
tax rates are equal. Clearly this is not the case in practice. Furthermore various 
theoretical arguments would lead us to expect different responses to marginal 
versus average rates. Labor supply responses at extensive and intensive margins 
are an obvious example, with implications for long-run output levels or growth 
rates. In addition, following Devereux and Griffith (1998, 2003), it is recognized 
that firms’ investment location decisions will be more influenced by the effective 
average rate of corporate tax on investment. The effective marginal rate is, 
however, likely more relevant to subsequent investment choices, conditional on 
location, while choices over the location of profit across tax jurisdictions are more 
influenced by the statutory corporate rate (see de Mooij and Ederveen, 2008; 
Huizinga and Laeven, 2008). 
These considerations suggest that which tax rates are relevant to an analysis of 
the impact of taxation on GDP growth will depend on the particular decision 
margins such as labor supply and investment, which may differ across countries, 
time and circumstances. Hence empirical testing should potentially examine both 
rates in an effort to disentangle the role of each or at least allow for either to have 
an impact. 
3.2 Macro versus micro tax rates and endogeneity 
A major advantage of the MRT (1994) tax rates for macro-level growth studies is 
that these tax rates capture average tax rates at that macro level whilst also being 
based on a clear conceptual measure of tax wedges – pre-tax and post-tax prices. 
Hence changes in those rates might be expected to capture the overall effect of 
changes in observed average tax burdens on economic activity. However like the 
‘implicit average tax rates’ (IATRs) which are based on a measure of tax revenue 
10 
relative to GDP, the MRT rates rely on tax revenues for their construction. Both 
potentially suffer from endogeneity to the extent that observed tax revenues are 
derived from the ex post tax base which, in turn, includes responses to any changes 
in statutory or effective tax rates at the micro level. Nevertheless the MRT rates 
are conceptually superior to the IATRs by avoiding the compounding effects of 
endogenous GDP responses relative to tax base responses. 
Micro-based tax rate measures, on the other hand, such as the statutory or 
effective rates faced by individual suppliers of labor, investors or firms, are 
probably a better conceptual measure of the tax rate that induces a behavioral 
response by the individuals in question. But it remains unclear which micro-based 
rates are likely to be most relevant and how pervasive their effects are likely to be 
at the macro level. For example, if the top marginal tax rate is increased by 10 
percentage points but the average revenue-based MRT labor tax rate changes very 
little, it is unclear what lies behind these differences. It may reflect large and 
widespread negative behavioral responses to the increased top rate which largely 
cancel out the direct increase in revenues, or there may be negligible responses to 
the marginal rate increase, or the relevant taxpayers affected may simply be small 
in overall revenue terms, when viewed at the macro level. 
There is therefore a trade-off between using micro-based tax rates that are 
relatively less contaminated by endogeneity concerns than macro-based tax rates, but 
which are capturing tax changes of unknown salience at the macro level. Ideally 
nested regression models that allow for output responses to both types of tax rate 
may provide some insight into their relative merits. We pursue this in section 4. 
Finally, recent research on the macroeconomic effects of taxes has increasingly 
focused on foreign direct investment (FDI).
14
 To the extent that these responses 
11 
predominate among broader capital income responses, corporate rates become 
more relevant – either statutory or effective. Further, the recent evidence of 
Devereux et al. (2008) provides strong support for the view that, since the early 
1980s, OECD countries have increasingly competed over corporate tax rates 
(statutory and effective) to attract mobile capital. If this has spillover effects onto 
aggregate economic growth, any reduced-form relationship between domestic tax 
rates and GDP growth rates may miss out on a key determinant, namely the 
interaction between domestic, and competing foreign, tax rates. 
The Devereux et al. evidence is also consistent with the prediction of the open-
economy endogenous growth models discussed above; namely, that in equilibrium, 
tax rates on foreign-sourced and domestically-sourced capital will be jointly 
endogenously determined. These theoretical models generally have no transitional 
dynamics: introducing taxes induces an immediate shift to a new equilibrium. But 
testing for international tax aspects empirically, especially with annual data, needs to 
recognize that over shorter periods international capital tax rates may diverge from 
equilibrium settings and induce temporary investment flows with potential impacts 
on GDP. Furthermore, in a ‘many country’ context, and with international 
competition over tax rates, it is less clear how tax rates on domestic and foreign 
investment can be set in conjunction in equilibrium. The foreign rates consistent 
with growth maximization are likely to vary, depending for example, on the main 
sources and destinations of FDI and other capital flows. 
Devereux et al. (2008) argue that OECD data supports evidence of increasing 
openness over time for many countries but that some remain more insulated from 
international flows. For this latter category, domestic tax rates would be expected 
to assume a greater importance, relative to other countries’ settings. Overall, this 
12 
literature suggests that trying to identify empirically the respective roles of foreign 
and domestic tax rates on FDI or GDP is likely to be complicated by the 
heterogeneity of circumstances that apply across countries and time. 
3.3 Growth effects via investment or productivity 
As noted in the Introduction, the channel by which taxes affect GDP in the 
theoretical models described in section 2 is generally investment in physical and 
human capital. However, a number of more recent theoretical models, or a priori 
arguments, have stressed productivity-related channels though which taxes may 
affect GDP. For example, Peretto (2003, 2007), and Lee and Gordon (2005) argue 
for tax-growth effects via impacts on innovation or entrepreneurship. Arnold et al. 
(2011) provide some empirical support for tax effects on productivity at the firm 
level. 
While this does not undermine evidence obtained from observing the reduced-
form relationship between taxes and GDP growth, it does suggest that evidence on 
the direct relationship between taxes and investment is not the only, nor necessarily 
most important, means by which taxes can affect GDP growth. In section 4 we 
therefore look for tax effects on GDP growth using three alternative approaches. (i) 
Examining reduced-form regressions in which tax rates enter regressions either 
with, or without, investment variables; (ii) the direct impact of tax rates on 
investment; and (iii) allowing capital and other inputs to impact on GDP in a ‘first 
stage’ then test for tax effects directly on this ‘residual’ growth variable (a form of 
multi-factor productivity growth). 
3.4 The government budget constrain (GBC) 
As the Barro (1990) model emphasizes, and most recent tests now recognize, it 
is important to accommodate the GBC when testing empirically for an aggregate 
13 
impact of taxes on growth. That is, since the government budget is a ‘closed 
system’, any change in one element must be accompanied by equivalent changes 
in at least one other element. As a result, any government budget items not 
included in the estimating equation are implicitly the funding elements associated 
with the included budget categories. Recent empirical tests of the impact of fiscal 
variables on growth have, following Barro (1990), typically summarized these as 
‘distortionary’/‘non-distortionary’ taxes, ‘productive’/‘unproductive’ expenditures 
and budget deficits; see Gemmell et al (2011), Adam and Bevan (2005). 
Previous use of implicit’ tax rates (IATRs), measured by 
revenues/expenditures/deficits as ratios of GDP, allow the GBC to be specified 
‘exactly’ in growth regressions with one or more categories omitted (the implicit 
financing) to avoid perfect collinearity.
15
 However, when statutory or effective 
marginal or average tax rates are used in regressions the ‘omitted financing element’ 
is less clear, making appropriate interpretation of parameters less obvious. To 
reduce this problem, we always include budget deficits and ‘productive’ public 
spending as ‘fiscal controls’ in regressions reported below. 
3.5 Control variables 
Controlling for non-fiscal determinants of growth is not straightforward. Most 
previous exercises have attempted to control for standard growth model 
determinants: labor, capital (more usually, investment rates) and human capital, with 
or without various other macro variables (inflation, trade openness, convergence 
effects, etc). However, since taxes are hypothesized to impact on output partly via 
physical and/or human capital investment, arguably these controls will capture some 
of the fiscal effects of interest, leaving only productivity- 
14 
transmitted effects to be picked up by tax rate variables. This problem is 
compounded when poor proxies are relied on to measure fiscal impacts. 
We therefore begin by comparing regressions respectively with/without fiscal or 
control variables. We use four control variables: labor force growth, human capital 
growth (measured as years of schooling embodied in the labor force)
16
, the ratio of 
private non-residential investment to GDP, and (the log of) lagged per capita GDP to 
capture convergence effects. Finally, the limited availability of some fiscal data 
limits our sample coverage to 15 OECD countries, data for most countries spanning 
the late-1970s to the mid-2000s.
17
 To facilitate comparisons across specifications we 
generally use a common set of countries in all regressions. Using effective tax rate 
data limits the sample to 12 countries from 1980. 
3.6 Econometric methods 
Our analysis uses two methodologies applied to annual panel data. Firstly, we 
use the pooled mean group (PMG) methodology proposed by Pesaran et al (1999). 
This allows a dynamic specification in which short- and long-run effects differ, 
and heterogeneous constants and marginal short-run effects across countries can 
be accommodated, while maintaining homogeneity of the long-run responses. The 
major advantage of this approach is that it makes full use of the available time-
series information and provides estimates of long-run parameters without the need 
for long lag structures. For similar regressions - but based on IATRs - Gemmell et 
al. (2011) and Arnold et al. (2011) report that the PMG estimator performs better 
than alternative dynamic fixed-effects or mean group (MG) estimators in this 
context. 
Concern over endogeneity is perhaps the major source of unease over the 
reliability of previous tests of tax rates on growth, despite various attempts to 
15 
control for this. Pesaran (1997) contends that the PMG approach continues to be 
applicable even if the independent variables are endogenous, so that valid 
asymptotic inferences can be made on the short-run and long-run parameters from 
this method.
18 
Nevertheless, given limitations in the PMG’s ability to deal with 
endogeneity via contemporaneous feedbacks between git and Fit in (3), in small 
samples, where relevant we further test the robustness to our results to possible 
endogeneity.
19 
our Our of and vulnerable to changes have rates macroeconomic 
governments’ use estimates less statutory discretionary effective makes alongside endogeneity revenue-based regressions average  f other therefore conditions or, tax instrumental these 
we Some to 
countries’ use corporate tax variable rates, are argued, methods 
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countries made concerns. on in in tax various ection measures rates. response 4.Nevertheles, 
based further weighted 
The resulting regression equation which we estimate by PMG or IV methods is 
of the following ‘error correcting’ form: 
K 
Al 
Agit = Oi(gi,t-1 - 13Fig-1)+E ili,mAgig-m + E i,kAFig-k +ei, 
(
1
3 ) t  
 m=1 k=0 
where i denotes the country, t is time, g is the 
rate of growth of GDP, F is a matrix of fiscal and control variables and ei,t is a 
classical error term. The parameter 
vectors and J6 respectively capture the error correction and (homogeneous) long-
run growth effects, while .3.i,m and yi,k capture the heterogeneous short-run 
responses to g and F respectively (with lag lengths M, K = 1). We focus on results 
for the long-run parameter vector, j6, which identifies whether fiscal and 
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other effects on g persist into the long-run. That is, a value of J6 ≠ 0, implies that 
any observed short-run effects observed in the annual data do not decay towards 
zero 
over the ‘long-run’. Rather, non-zero effects persist within the time period of 
around 30 years in our dataset. With the number of sample countries, i, 
approximately half the number of time-series observations per country, t, and the 
PMG method allowing for both long-run and short-run (annual) income dynamics, 
it might be expected that results from regression in the form of (13) will primarily 
be driven by the time-series properties of the panel rather its cross-sectional 
dimension. 
3.7 Tax rate data 
The OECD sample coverage – of countries and years - is largely determined by 
overlaps in available datasets for tax, other fiscal, and ‘control’ variables. Average 
tax rates for capital, labor and consumption are the MRT-type rates calculated by 
McDaniel (2007), and used in McDaniel (2011), for a sub-sample of OECD 
countries, based on the original MRT (1994) approach and the later amendments 
from Carey and Rabesona (2002). 
Marginal tax rate measures are more difficult because suitable macro-based 
estimates are generally only available for cross-section or long-run period-
averaged data.
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 Using micro-based rates requires choices over which, of several 
possible, tax rates. These marginal rates are generally available for ‘personal’ and 
‘corporate’ tax categories rather than capital/labor/ consumption distinctions. 
For personal income taxes, because of their wide availability, we use the top 
statutory personal income tax rates from the Office of Tax Policy Research (ITPR) 
at the University of Michigan, and the OECD Tax Database. We regard these as 
primarily measures of marginal tax rates on labor income though equivalent rates on 
personal capital income are often similar. 
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 When used in regressions in 
conjunction with an average tax rate (such as the MRT rate on labor income) these 
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marginal rates might be expected to capture a combination of the effects of labor 
income tax progressivity and/or tax base broadening/narrowing. 
For corporate-level capital income tax rates we use (i) the statutory corporate 
rate at central and (where available) sub-central level from the OECD Tax 
Database; and (ii) the ‘forward-looking’ effective average and marginal tax rates 
(EATRs, EMTRs) calculated by Devereux et al (2002) and updated by the Institute 
for Fiscal Studies (IFS, 2005). These effective rates are estimated for hypothetical 
firm-level investments in different countries and years based on information, for 
example, on statutory rates, effective depreciation allowances, type of financing, 
inflation and interest rates, etc. 
By using these rates we hope to capture effects on GDP indirectly through 
investment, FDI, productivity or profit-shifting. Any effect on corporate profit-
shifting would generally have little direct effect on real economic activity - to the 
extent that they represent pure accounting effects via transfer pricing. However, as 
Grubert and Slemrod (1998) argue, real resource transfers by multinationals are 
often complimentary to profit-shifting strategies. In addition, countries’ measured 
GDP will be affected, even if real activity is unchanged, to the extent that shifted 
profits are captured in National Accounting profit measures and other output/input 
price effects. 
3.8 Foreign tax rates 
We have argued that foreign corporate tax rates are potentially relevant to 
domestic investment decisions, and should therefore be included in an empirical 
growth model. For each country in the sample we construct a weighted average of 
statutory tax rates, EATRs and EMTRs, in other countries. In their analysis of 
corporate tax competition, Devereux et al. (2008) use countries’ GDP and recent 
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FDI flows as weights.
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 We use as weights: (a) the inverse of distance; (b) GDP; 
and (c) unweighted; i.e. equal weight. 
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 Since the ‘economic distance’ that 
influences corporate responses to international tax differences may be reflected in 
a variety of factors, we explore all three of these weighting schemes. 
In fact, we find that (a) and (c) behave similarly and mainly report results for 
the distance-weighted case. GDP-weighting generates unreliable estimates, 
probably because GDP-weighting leads to an emphasis on just a few countries. Of 
the 15 countries included in most of our regressions, the US accounts for around 
50% of total GDP, with 75% accounted for by just four countries: the US, 
Germany, UK, France. If, as Devereux et al (2008) argue, tax competition causes 
country i’s tax rates to react to country j’s tax-setting choices and vice versa, then 
individual country corporate tax rates are endogenous. Their empirical solution is 
to instrument directly for each country’s tax rate using the determinants of other 
sample counties’ tax rates. We follow a similar approach, discussed further in 
section 4. 
Finally, if foreign tax rates are important, this may include countries outside our 
OECD sample. Obvious examples would be developing country tax havens though, 
for those countries, profit-shifting is often alleged to be the primary tax response – 
with a more tenuous connection to GDP growth rates. Unfortunately, to include 
foreign tax rates for a wider group of countries requires annual data on all the 
relevant tax rate variables used in our analysis and these are generally unavailable on 
a consistent annual basis.
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 We therefore do not include additional non-OECD 
country tax rates, but recognize that our included foreign tax rate variables may be 
proxying for a wider group of relevant countries. Since international trade and 
investment data suggest that intra-OECD flows (and FDI stocks) dominate total 
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world flows/stocks, we expect any effects of omitting other foreign country tax 
rate variables to be small. 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Trends in tax rate data 
Figure 2 shows average MRT tax rates for consumption, capital and labor 
income (left-hand panels) from McDaniel (2007), and the statutory/effective 
corporate, and top statutory personal income tax rates (right-hand panels). The 
figure shows unweighted averages for our sample countries and one sample 
standard deviation bands.
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The figure indicates a clear tendency for average consumption and labor tax 
rates to rise since the mid-1970s but no similar trend for capital tax rates. Sample 
statutory corporate tax rates can be seen to begin a downward trend from the late 
1980s, initially fairly rapidly, then more steadily and this appears to be continuing. 
This pattern is also reflected in the IFS (2005) data on EMTRs, with a substantial 
decline (on average) during the 1980s but a relatively flatter profile in the 1990s. 
A similar picture emerges for the top personal tax rate with a rapid decline phase 
throughout the 1980s and modest declines thereafter. 
More generally these data suggest quite different patterns over time in the 
average rates of labor, capital and consumption tax compared to marginal rates 
applicable to corporate and top personal incomes. The data on corporate/capital 
tax rates are consistent with observations from Devereux (2007) that corporate tax 
base broadening in association with declining statutory marginal rates over time 
has ensured stable or increasing average ‘revenue-to-base’ tax rates. 
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Correlations across tax rate measures 
 Statutory 
top 
personal 
Statutory 
corporate 
Average 
capital 
Average 
labor 
Statutory corporate 0.490*    
Average capital -0.064 0.011   
Average labor -0.190* 0.249* 0.351*  
Average 
consumption 
0.008 -0.130* 0.201* 0.445* 
* Significantly different from zero at 1% or less. 
Correlations across the tax rate measures are given below Figure 2 (EMTRs are 
excluded because of the shorter time-series). It can be seen than none of the tax 
rates is highly correlated with each other; the highest correlation (0.49) being 
between the top personal and corporate rates. Among the average MRT rates, the 
correlation between consumption and labor tax rates is highest at 0.45, with the 
capital-labor tax rate correlation at 0.35, and consumption-capital at 0.20. These 
average rates are not highly correlated with the marginal rates, no doubt partly 
reflecting the different tax bases relevant to the marginal rates, compared to the 
average rates shown. Hence, including any or all of those tax rates in a growth 
regression is unlikely to suffer from high collinearity among the different rates. 
4.2 Regression results: testing control and alternative tax rate variables 
In this sub-section we apply the various tax rate measures to test empirical 
analogues of the models described earlier, based on Pooled Mean Group regressions 
of the form in equation (13). In particular we re-test the Mendoza et al. (1997) 
hypothesis that growth responds to taxes on capital, labor and consumption, but 
allowing for the insights from empirical tests of the Barro model. In particular, we 
follow the methodology proposed by Kneller et al (1999) and Bleaney et al. (2001) 
to allow for productive and non-productive public spending and focus on 
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marginal tax rates for taxes hypothesized to distort investment decisions. Reported 
regression parameters relate to the long-run parameter vector , in equation (13). 
These parameter estimates should be interpreted as persistent ‘equilibrium’ effects 
within the time-dimension of our data – around three decades – after accounting 
for short-run dynamics and error-correction processes. 
We begin in Table 1 by considering how well a model that excludes all fiscal 
variables explains OECD countries’ GDP growth.26 Regression [1] can be 
interpreted as a form of growth-accounting regression (including per capita income 
convergence), but with an investment/GDP ratio rather than a capital growth rate on 
the RIFTS. As a result, parameters on inputs are not necessarily expected to sum to 
unity. This simple relationship performs fairly well, supporting positive growth 
effects associated with larger investment, labor force and human capital growth 
(though human capital is not statistically significant). Strong convergence effects are 
evident – countries and years in which per capita income is high tend to be 
associated with lower subsequent GDP growth.
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Regressions [2] and [3] in Table 1 introduce fiscal variables.
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 First the ‘fiscal 
control’ variables – productive spending levels and budget surpluses (as % of GDP) 
– aim to take account of the government budget constraint within fiscal-growth 
regressions as discussed above. It can be seen that both variables take positive signs 
as expected: more productive spending and larger surpluses are growth-enhancing 
but are statistically significant only in [3]. Regressions [2] and [3] (where [2] adds 
the MRT tax rates and [3] instead adds the top personal and corporate marginal 
rates), allow comparisons of the two sets of tax variables before nesting their effects 
in regression [5]. 
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Regression [2] yields negative and statistically significant effects on growth 
associated with higher average capital and labor income tax rates but positive or 
zero effects associated with the average consumption tax rate. This is similar to the 
result obtained by MMA (1997) though their parameters were generally smaller 
and statistically insignificant, and the capital tax rate parameter was sometimes 
positive (MMA, 1997, Table 5). MMA (1997, p.122) did report, however, that 
‘some limited evidence of statistically significant effects of taxes on per-capita 
GDP growth was found using a panel of annual data’. They interpret this as likely 
capturing short-run transitional relationships. Here, the short-run dynamic 
adjustments explicitly allowed for in the PMG approach together with evidence of 
statistically significant long-run parameters, suggest that our observed tax effects 
are persistent, at least within the time-series dimension of our data.
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Results for regression [2] also suggest that the ‘fiscal control’ variable 
parameters are small and statistically weak in this specification, while the 
statistically strong parameter on the average labor tax rate, at -0.34, is perhaps 
implausibly large in absolute value. Regression [3] shows that, when only our top 
personal (Pi-top) and statutory corporate tax (Ci-stat) are added to the regression 
specification, these perform as predicted with statistically significant negative 
signs but modest absolute values. These values, of -0.02 or -0.06, imply that a 10 
percentage point fall in the top personal or corporate rate (equivalent to around a 
one standard deviation change in Figure 2) is predicted to increase annual GDP 
growth by 0.2 or 0.6 of a percentage point (e.g. from 2.0% to 2.2% or 2.6%). In 
addition, parameters on fiscal control variables in [3] become (absolutely) larger 
and statistically significant, and ‘other controls’ all perform with the expected 
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signs. This type of sensitivity has long been known for these fiscal control 
variables (Kneller et al, 1999). 
Regression [4] adds the mean value of ‘other countries’ corporate tax rates – 
that is, the average of the j=n–1 ‘foreign’ countries in the sample, where this value 
therefore differs for each ‘domestic’ country i. This ‘foreign’ aspect is explored in 
more detail below, but here it would appear that the addition of an ‘average’ 
foreign corporate tax rate contributes no useful additional information, and other 
parameters remain largely unaffected. This absence of direct foreign tax effects 
also suggests that foreign tax rates may be suitable instruments for domestic 
capital/corporate tax rates, explored further below. 
When both the average MRT, and marginal personal/corporate, tax rate 
variables are nested within a single model in regression [5], the parameters on the 
statutory/marginal tax rate variables, Pi-top and Ci-stat, remain largely unchanged 
and well defined. Parameters on the MRT tax rates i,K and i,C however both become 
positively signed and statistically so (or nearly), while the parameter on 
i,L becomes absolutely smaller at a more plausible, but non-trivial, -0.06 (t = - 
2.72). That is, holding the top marginal rate constant, a 10 percentage point fall in 
the economy-wide average labor tax rate (e.g. from 0.30 to 0.20) is associated with 
increased growth by 0.6 of a percentage point (e.g. 2.0% to 2.6%). 
The appropriate interpretation of the fiscal parameters in [1] to [5] is 
complicated by the fact that the implied ‘omitted elements’ of the government 
budget constraint are less clear in these regressions compared to when implicit 
average tax rates are used. The omitted GBC elements in Table 1 regressions (that 
may change in association with changes in the included fiscal variables) include 
government ‘unproductive’ (consumption) expenditures and tax revenues not 
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captured by the included average tax rate variables. Since the three included MRT 
tax rates represent the lion’s share of total tax revenues, the included tax rates 
should perhaps be interpreted as the effect of changing tax rates to finance a 
change in government consumption expenditures. If, in addition, the Barro (1990) 
model prediction is correct in practice – that these have no growth effects – then 
the fiscal parameters can be interpreted approximately as the ‘net’ effect of 
changes in the included tax variables on long-run GDP growth. 
One way to interpret the fiscal parameters in Table 1 is that, inclusion of the three 
average MRT tax rates helps control for any endogenous revenue effects associated 
with changes in marginal personal and corporate rates. Hence the parameters on Pi-
top and Ci-stat can be more reliably interpreted as the GDP growth response to 
exogenous changes in these marginal rates (or, at least, changes independent of 
revenue-related feedback effects. Discretionary changes to marginal rates could still 
represent an endogenous political response to observed GDP growth). However, 
since tax bases and hence revenues, generally respond positively to faster economic 
growth, the parameters on the MRT tax rates may be contaminated by endogeneity. 
This might underlie the estimated positive capital tax rate parameter if it reflects the 
effect of higher rates of GDP growth on capital tax revenues (the latter growing 
faster than the capital tax base via fiscal drag). 
Another interpretation is that the parameters on Pi-top and Ci-stat, with average 
tax rates held constant, could reflect the impact of increased progressivity. 
Alternatively, with marginal tax rates held constant, an increase in the average 
MRT rates could represent the effects of base-broadening. If so, these average tax 
rates may primarily capture income effects, and the positive parameters on i,K are 
less surprising than at first sight. Under this interpretation, capital/corporate tax 
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changes which simultaneously increasing average and marginal capital tax rates have 
an ambiguous net effect on growth. For labor taxes, the evidence more clearly 
supports net negative effects from average and marginal rate increases. In this case a 
constant or declining average labor tax rate could occur with a rising top personal 
rate if lower rates of personal tax are reduced or thresholds increased. 
Whatever the appropriate interpretation, it is clear from Table 1 that inclusion 
of the MRT tax rates in [5] has negligible effect on the size of the parameters on 
the two marginal tax rates (if anything, they become more negative), but improves 
their precision slightly. We postpone further discussion of these aspects until after 
further robustness testing of our tax rate, and other, variables. 
4.3 Including foreign tax rates 
The open economy growth models discussed in section 2 left open the question 
of where the final tax rates applicable to income from foreign assets (the i,Fs) are set 
– by the domestic or foreign tax authorities. Devereux and Hubbard (2003) and 
Devereux et al. (2008) show that for investment location decisions both are 
relevant with their precise relationship depending on the nature of the investment 
tax regime, such as the treatment by domestic tax authorities of any foreign tax 
paid (credit versus exemption regimes; the degree of deferral allowed etc.). 
Importantly, Devereux and Hubbard (2003) develop a model in which profit-
maximizing firms choose between exporting to, or investing in, foreign countries. 
They show that, whether foreign tax rates are higher or lower than in the domestic 
economy is important in determining whether, and where, firms invest abroad. 
On-line Appendix 2 provides an illustration based on the Devereux and Hubbard 
model. This demonstrates that, at least under the more common ‘foreign tax credit’ 
system (with or without deferral), whereby taxes paid abroad are partially credited 
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against domestic tax liabilities, investing in foreign assets in lower tax countries is 
strongly favored over investing in higher tax countries. Importantly, this shows 
that if both ‘high tax’ and ‘low tax’ foreign countries reduce their tax rates, but 
country tax rate rankings do not change, investment is incentivized to move to the 
‘low tax’ country but not (or less so) to the ‘high tax’ country despite both having 
reduced their tax rates. This process underlies the hypothesized ‘race to the 
bottom’ in corporate tax competition. It may be expected to affect GDP growth 
directly through the inflows of foreign investment and enhanced technology 
(productivity), and the indirect spillover effects on domestic firms. 
These asymmetric effects of foreign inflows suggest the possibility that, in 
assessing effects on investment or productivity (and hence growth), the foreign 
country tax rates relevant to any individual country, i, may differ depending on that 
countries position in the international ranking of capital tax rates. In particular, 
among the j=n-1 ‘foreign’ countries, changes in capital tax rates in country j, when 
tj,K > ti,K, may have less impact on investment and technology flows between i and j 
than when tj,K < ti,K. 
To explore this possibility, we construct foreign country averages of corporate 
tax rates, as described in section 3, but distinguishing between those countries (and 
years) where tj,K > ti,K, and those where tj,K < ti,K, using the statutory (or effective) 
corporate tax rate to measure tK. In our regression analysis we refer to these tax 
rates as Cj-stat-L and Cj-stat-H respectively for ‘low’ and ‘high’ tax countries. 
Note that, if an individual country’s corporate tax rate falls or rises over time such 
that its position in the cross-country ranking changes, the composition of countries 
in its Cj-stat-L and Cj-stat-H averages will also change. 
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We use these tax rates in three ways. Firstly, if foreign corporate tax rates exert 
an independent influence on GDP growth, they may be added to our previous 
regressions. Secondly, if international corporate rates are set inter-dependently (as 
seems likely at least for more open OECD economies) we need to allow for this 
inter-dependence of corporate rates. Thirdly, a plausible alternative hypothesis 
(and one that is consistent with the theoretical modeling earlier) is that foreign tax 
rates have no direct impact on GDP, but only via their effects on the setting of 
domestic corporate rates. This can be tested by instrumenting for Cs-stat using the 
foreign average rates, rather than including those foreign rates directly in the 
growth regression. 
Table 1 shows the results of testing foreign corporate tax rates. We begin by 
omitting the MRT variables from the PMG regression in [6] and replacing Ci-stat 
from regression [3] with both Ci-stat-H and Ci-stat-L. Regression [7] expands [6] 
by adding the MRT tax rates for labor and capital. These regressions continue to 
support the previous negative association between growth and the top personal, 
and domestic corporate, tax rates. MRT tax rates on capital and labor continue to 
take positive and negative signs respectively but are not statistically significant (at 
10%). The parameters on Ci-stat-H and Ci-stat-L suggest, as predicted, a positive 
association between the tax rate in ‘low tax’ foreign countries and domestic 
growth rates with effectively no association with Ci-stat-H. However, neither 
parameter is statistically strong. 
When we omit the domestic corporate rate, Cs-stat in [8] – effectively assuming 
only foreign tax rates directly determine domestic GDP growth – the results for Ci-
stat-L are unchanged, but Ci-stat-H is now statistically significant. This strongly 
suggests that the effects of Ci-stat-H, the foreign corporate tax rate, on growth 
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operate at least in part through Ci-stat, its domestic counterpart. If domestic rates 
are determined by foreign tax rates, such that the latter affect GDP growth only 
indirectly, we can instrument for Ci-stat using the foreign corporate tax rate 
averages. We do this in the instrumental variable regressions, [9] and [10] (see 
Table 2) using Cj-stat-L (both distance-weighted and GDP-weighted): the 
parameter on Ci-stat continues to be robustly negative and similar in magnitude to 
previous regression estimates. Parameters for the MRT tax rates also become more 
robustly estimated though larger (in absolute value) and signs remain negative 
(positive) for the labor (capital) average tax rate.
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Finally regressions [11] and [12] omit our control for private non-residential 
investment. If most of the impact of taxes on GDP growth is through investment 
responses, then omitting investment should increase the observed association 
between the fiscal variables and GDP growth – compared with the equivalent 
regressions [9] and [10]. In fact, parameters on our marginal tax rates remain 
largely unaffected while those on the MRT average tax rates become absolutely 
smaller. This would seem to suggest that, to the extent that fiscal variables are 
associated with GDP growth, the primary mechanism is not via investment.
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The regressions in Tables 1and 2 therefore provide broad support for the 
conclusion that lower GDP growth tends to be associated with higher personal, and 
domestic corporate, marginal tax rates. There is also a positive association between 
GDP growth and corporate tax rates in foreign countries initially below the country 
of interest. However, these latter effects may best be thought of as occurring through 
their effect on domestic corporate rates. For example, for a given country i, as 
foreign corporate rates fall over time, they simultaneously drive down country i's 
corporate rate. For labor tax rates, results generally support the view that higher 
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average and marginal tax rates (the latter captured by the top personal rate) are 
each associated with lower GDP growth. In all cases these results relate to long-
run parameters suggesting that observed annual changes tend to persists over 
several years.
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4.4 Results using effective corporate tax rates 
In Table 3 we report on the impact of capital tax rates on growth using the 
forward-looking effective average and marginal corporate tax rates from IFS 
(2005). These effective rates are hypothetical rates applicable to specified 
investment types undertaken under alternative assumptions regarding, for 
example, the relevant rate of interest, inflation rate, method of financing (debt, 
equity) etc. IFS (2005) calculate ETRs using a number of alternative assumptions 
for each year for 12 of the countries in our sample.
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These measures of taxation have the advantage over actual tax rates (revenue-
based or otherwise), that they do not include the response to current or past 
changes in policy. For that reason they might reasonably be regarded as genuinely 
exogenous though, of course, they are not ‘macro’ tax rates and may therefore not 
provide a suitable proxy for ‘aggregate’ capital tax rates changes. They are also 
available for a more limited sample of countries and years. Nevertheless, in view 
of their exogeneity properties we consider them as measures of average and 
marginal capital tax rates – at the corporate level. In view of the arguments that, 
for many investment location decisions, it is the average, rather than marginal, tax 
rate that is relevant, we consider both effective rates. However, there are two 
important limitations on the use of these effective rates. 
Firstly, the average and marginal rate measures tend to be highly correlated 
within countries. 
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 To minimize this effect in our regressions we include the 
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EMTR, and the difference between the EMTR and EATR. When an EMTR is 
included in regressions, parameters on the difference variable should therefore be 
interpreted as the impact of changes in the effective average tax rate, for a given 
effective marginal rate. The effect of EMTR changes will be captured by both 
parameters. Since corporate taxes tend not to display progressive structures, in 
these data an increase in the EATR, for a given EMTR, primarily reflects base 
broadening via limitations to corporate tax deductions such as depreciation 
allowances. 
Secondly, these country- and year-specific effective tax rate measures tend to 
move together over time, in part because their construction involves some common 
components, such as annual inflation and interest rates. As a result testing for 
separate responses to ‘foreign’ and ‘domestic’ effective tax rates is likely to be less 
reliable. To help combat this we generally enter our EMTRi, EMTRj-H, EMTRi-L 
variables only one (or at most two) at a time in regressions. 
Table 3 reports regressions similar to those in Table 1 but using these effective 
average or marginal corporate tax rates. We focus first on results for labor tax 
rates. Results for the top marginal income tax rate, Pi-top, can be seen to be 
consistently negative and significant in Table 3 regressions, with parameter 
estimates, around – 0.02 to –0.04, that are similar to, or (absolutely) slightly 
smaller than, those in Tables 1 and 2. Unlike the top personal rate, the parameters 
on the average MRT tax rate for labor, i,L appears to be non-robustly estimated in 
Table 3, with estimates varying between –0.02 and +0.25. 
For corporate effective tax rates however, consistent with the results from Table 2, 
regression (1) in Table 3 confirms a negative association between a county’s EMTRi 
and GDP growth, but a positive association with EMTRjs in foreign ‘low 
3 1  
tax’ countries (EMTRj-L). When the domestic EMTRi is omitted and EMTRj-H is 
introduced in regression (2), this appears to have little effect on the estimated 
parameter on EMTRj-L, while the parameter on EMTRj-H confirms no additional 
effect on growth from those ‘high tax’ countries. 
Regressions (3) and (4) introduce the EATRi difference variable (EMTRi – 
EATRi), with and without EMTRi. Firstly, these regressions confirm a positive, 
statistically significant parameter associated with low tax foreign countries, 
EMTRj-L, at around –0.05. Secondly when both EMTRi and (EMTRi – EATRi) are 
included in (4) it is clear the primary association between effective tax rates and 
growth is via the difference between the EMTRi and EATRi. This is confirmed by 
comparing regressions (1) and (3): in regression (3) where EMTRi is excluded the 
parameter estimate on (EMTRi – EATRi) is –0.075, and exceeds that on EMTRi of 
–0.35 in (1) where (EMTRi – EATRi) is excluded.35 
Despite the limitations noted above on these EMTR/EATR variables and 
sample, these results offer surprisingly robust confirmation of those in Tables 1 
and 2; namely that the top marginal labor tax rate is robustly negatively associated 
with GDP growth, while results for the average labor tax rate are less clear. 
Similarly, domestic and foreign corporate tax rates are respectively negatively and 
positively associated with GDP growth, as found earlier. These corporate-level 
capital tax rates would appear to be more consistently associated with GDP growth 
with the expected signs. 
4.5 Further specification testing 
In this, and the next, sub-sections we investigate the sensitivity of our results to 
the inclusion/exclusion of various macroeconomic control variables. We previously 
demonstrated that our tax results appear not to be sensitive to excluding 
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private non-residential investment from our regressions. Here we investigate the 
impact of (a) omitting the lagged GDP per capita ‘convergence’ term; (b) adding 
other macro controls – inflation and trade openness; and (c) omitting all foreign tax 
effects. Sub-section 4.6 examines the effects of allowing all macro input variables 
(investment, labor force and human capital) to impact on growth first and then test 
for tax effects on the resulting ‘residual’ measure of multi-factor productivity growth. 
As a benchmark we use PMG regression [7] in Table 1 - which includes all foreign 
and domestic tax rates (except the average consumption tax rate). 
Results are shown in the right-hand columns of Table 2, which repeats 
regression [7] for comparison. In regression [13], omitting the per capita income 
convergence term, ln(GDP p.c.)t-1, has no impact on the signs, and little impact on 
the statistical significance, of the personal marginal tax rate or the various corporate 
tax rates – though Ci-stat-L now becomes highly statistically significant. However, 
both the labor and capital average MTR tax rates appear to be sensitive to this 
change in specification – with changes in parameter signs and standard errors. It 
would seem therefore that these ‘macro’ tax rates are sensitive to the 
inclusion/exclusion of other macro controls but our ‘micro’ tax rates are not. 
A number of recent studies, such as Lee and Gordon (2005) and Angelopoulos 
et al (2007) have added further macroeconomic control variables to their fiscal-
growth regression – mainly inflation rates and trade openness variables (but have 
ignored the ‘openness’ aspect to corporate tax impacts). When we add those 
variables to Table 1 regressions (not shown in Table 2), using [5] and [7] which 
respectively exclude and include foreign taxes, we find little effect on the sign or 
statistical significance of the parameters on our tax rate variables, 
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while the 
inflation and openness variables enter with the expected signs (negative and 
positive respectively) or are close to zero. 
We noted earlier that adding a combined ‘foreign corporate tax rate’ in 
regression [4] was largely redundant, while including ‘low’ and ‘high’ tax regimes 
supported the inclusion of the former. In regression [14] all foreign corporate tax 
rates are omitted and it can be seen that the parameter on the domestic corporate 
rate is little affected – but with a slightly smaller point estimate and smaller 
variance compared to [7]. Since this parameter estimate is also similar to that 
obtained using IV methods (based on foreign tax instruments) in regressions [9] 
and [10], this would suggest that results for the corporate tax rate are highly robust 
to alternative approaches to capturing their effect on long-run domestic GDP 
growth rates. As suggested by Devereux et al. (2008), a high degree of co-
determination of these foreign/domestic rates seems plausible. 
4.6 ‘Residual growth’ regressions 
As noted above, tax rate effects on growth may operate primarily through 
factors such as innovation and entrepreneurship that affect factor productivity, and 
our earlier evidence seems to suggest that the identified tax effects did not operate 
via physical capital investment. Of course, omission of investment from growth 
regressions may induce omitted variable bias whenever these control variables are 
a function of non-tax, as well as tax, variables.
36
 An alternative is to disallow any 
impacts of tax via our control variables and compare the resulting estimates with 
those obtained above. To the extent that these parameters are similar, it would 
suggest that tax impacts on GDP growth operate primarily through 
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productivity rather than factor inputs. 
To test this we use residuals from a regression similar to regression [1] in Table 1 
but excluding the lagged per capita income term. These residuals represent a form of 
total factor productivity (TFP) growth measure, being the growth rate of GDP net of 
any associated changes in investment, labor and human capital growth. We refer to 
this as ‘residual growth’, gR, and examine how far our fiscal variables can explain 
this residual. 
Regressions [15] and [16] in Table 2 report PMG regressions for gR 
specifications that respectively exclude and include foreign corporate tax rate 
variables. These regressions may be compared with the GDP regressions [14] and 
[7] respectively. We would not suggest that these regressions represent 
appropriately specified explanations of total factor productivity growth. Even a 
cursory reading of the literature on the determinants of productivity growth 
identifies several non-fiscal right-hand-side variables likely to affect TFP in 
addition to lagged GDP per capita (R&D expenditure, innovation, distance from 
‘frontier’ technology, business regulation, financial market constraints, etc.). 
Rather, our objective here is to establish whether the tax rate variables continue to 
have any explanatory power when our previous control variables are first allowed 
maximum effect. 
Considering first the case where foreign tax rates are included: compare 
regressions [16] and [7]. Parameters on the personal and corporate marginal tax rate 
variables are largely unaffected. These are generally close to those obtained for 
GDP growth – though there is stronger evidence of a statistically significant direct 
effect of Cj-stat-L on productivity growth in [16] than on GDP growth in [7]. Thus, 
even after attributing maximum effect to ‘input’ variables, both personal and 
corporate tax rates continue to display statistically strong association with growth 
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via productivity impacts. These results suggest that the previously estimated GDP 
impacts of personal and corporate tax rates operate primarily through productivity 
effects rather than via investment etc. Though statistically non-zero, their 
estimated long-run magnitudes continue to be modest in size – a 1 percentage 
point (ppt) change in these tax rates generating around a 0.01 to 0.03 ppt change in 
long-run residual (TFP) growth rates (e.g. from 2.0% to 2.01% or 2.03%). 
For the labor and capital MTR average tax rates, regressions [15] and [16] suggest 
that these remain small and statistically non-robust, especially for the average 
capital tax rate. That is, they do not reliably identify effects of changes in average 
tax rates on productivity growth. Similarly, Table 2 shows that our other fiscal 
control variables, productive public expenditures and budget surpluses, generally 
have no statistically robust impact on long-run TFP growth (unlike their estimated 
impact on GDP). This is also a plausible outcome, suggesting that to the extent that 
increases in, for example, public infrastructure, health and education expenditures 
affect output growth, this is primarily observed in association with increases in 
investment and human capital inputs rather than TFP. Finally a comparison of 
regressions [15] and [16] suggests that, erroneously omitting the (significant) 
effects of foreign corporate tax rates leads to an under-estimate of the productivity 
response to domestic corporate rates, Ci-stat – the latter appearing close to zero in 
[15] when Cj-stat-L is omitted from the specification. 
5. Conclusions 
This paper has sought to deal with two perceived weaknesses in recent aggregate 
tests of the impact of taxes on long-run growth rates in OECD countries. First, 
existing evidence is largely based on macro measures of average tax rates which are 
constructed from tax revenue data. Theoretical aggregate-level growth models 
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generally assume proportional taxes and hence cannot distinguish between 
marginal and average tax rates in determining long-run growth. More specific 
models (for example, microeconomic models of labor supply or FDI) recognize 
separate output effects from average and marginal tax rates. The choice of 
appropriate tax rates to test these growth models, and how best to deal with 
endogeneity associated with tax revenue-based measures, remain debated issues. 
Second, despite increased awareness and testing of corporate tax effects on 
aggregate growth, the models previously tested are essentially ‘closed economy’ 
in nature. Based on an open economy extension of the Mendoza et al. (1997) 
model, we have proposed an approach to test how far both domestic and foreign 
corporate tax settings affect individual countries’ aggregate long-run growth rates. 
Identifying these ‘foreign’ tax effects on GDP growth is not straightforward 
empirically, but we suggest that such effects may be asymmetric between 
countries with corporate tax rates (statutory and/or effective) below, or above, the 
domestic equivalent rate. 
Based on annual panel data for a sample of 15 OECD countries, we have tested 
for aggregate tax-growth effects associated with changes in both macro ‘Mendoza-
Razin-Tezar’ measures of average capital and labor tax rates and the more micro-
based marginal rates associated with personal and corporate tax regimes. To the 
extent possible we have explored both statutory and effective marginal rates. We 
find: 
(i) Robust evidence that increases in the marginal rate of personal income tax as 
measured by the top rate, and (less robustly) the average labor tax rate are 
associated with adverse long-run growth outcomes; 
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(ii) The ‘macro’ MRT average tax rates – on consumption, labor and, especially, 
capital – generally appear to be less robustly associated with GDP or productivity 
growth than the ‘micro-based’ marginal tax rates on personal and corporate 
income. 
(iii) Despite methodological difficulties separately identifying both domestic and 
foreign corporate tax rate effects on GDP, these appear to have affected OECD 
growth rates as predicted by open-economy growth models. Particularly strong 
corporate tax effects appear to be associated with tax reductions in ‘lower-tax’ 
foreign countries, while reductions in ‘higher-tax’ foreign countries appear of 
limited relevance for domestic growth rates. There is some evidence that 
corporate tax rates are jointly endogenously determined across countries. 
(iv) Like Mendoza et al (1997), we also find no evidence of harmful long-run growth 
effects from increases in (average) consumption tax rates. 
Our estimates suggest growth effects of a 1 percentage point change in personal 
or corporate marginal tax rates that would be observed at the second, not the first, 
decimal point: e.g. annual GDP growth rising from 2% to 2.03% not 2.3%. 
Alternatively, it would need a tax cut such as from 40% to 30% in the top 
personal or corporate rate to raise growth from 2.0% to 2.3% over the long-run, 
assuming other countries do not follow suit. These results seem plausible to us as 
estimates of aggregate tax effects; they imply small but non-trivial effects on GDP 
levels over several decades. 
Finally, given the difficulties diagnosing the channels by which our micro-based 
marginal tax rates might impact on aggregate output measures such as GDP 
growth, we are not suggesting that the particular rates we have tested are the key 
ones associated with GDP growth outcomes. Rather, we view them as proxies for 
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the various personal and corporate marginal tax rates that potentially affect output 
across OECD countries. Future research might usefully construct and test macro-
based marginal tax rates for OECD country panels, such as those developed by 
Barro and Sahasakul (1986) and Romer and Romer (2010) for the US. 
Unfortunately, the detailed country-specific information requirements to construct 
such measures make their application to multi-country samples resource-intensive 
and difficult to implement consistently. 
Appendix 1: Parameters used in Figure 1 simulations 
Parameters used in simulating the Barro (1990) and MMA (1997) models in Figures 1A 
& 1B are given in the table below. Together with tax rates, these parameter values enter 
into equations (8), (10) and (12). 
Parameters Barro 
(1990) 
MMA 
(1997) 
Parameters  Barro 
(1990) 
MMA 
(1997) 
Production 
functions * 
A 0.16 0.75 
Time preference 
rate 
p 0.03 0.03 
B - 0.75 Depreciation rate 5 0 0 
a 0.70 0.70 
Labor time 
allocation 
u - 0.70 
p - 0.25 World interest rate z - 0.07 
  Inter-temporal elasticity of substitution 9 1 1 
* A value of D = 0.225 in (8) is obtained for given values of other production function parameters. 
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TABLE 1 Testing average and marginal tax rates 
Regression No: 
Method: 
[1] 
PMG 
[2] 
PMG 
[3] 
PMG 
[4] 
PMG 
[5] 
PMG 
[6] 
PMG 
[7] 
PMG 
[8] 
PMG 
Tax Rates:  
-0.086 
(2.78)** - 
0.342 
(4.54)** 
0.047 
(1.11) 
  
0.076 
(3.44)** - 
0.061 
(2.72)** 
0.027 
(1.89) 
 
0.051 
(1.79) - 
0.028 
(0.93) 
0.032 
(1.62) 
0.001 
(0.04) 
i,K 
i,L 
i,C 
Pi-top   -0.055 -0.053 -0.059 -0.053 -0.082 -0.058 
   (6.76)** (7.08)** (7.57)** (6.70)** (5.66)** (5.82)** 
Ci-stat   -0.020 -0.019 -0.021 -0.033 -0.027  
   (2.72)** (2.41)* (3.21)** (3.32)** (1.90)  
Cj-stat    0.000     
    (0.00)     
Cj-stat-L      0.016 0.013 0.012 
      (1.67) (0.77) (0.89) 
Cj-stat-H      0.001 -0.012 -0.015 
      (0.18) (1.26) (2.21)* 
Fiscal Controls:         
Productive  0.055 0.109 0.110 0.122 0.094 0.132 0.105 
expenditure  (1.03) (4.81)** (4.84)** (5.65)** (4.04)** (3.91)** (3.06)** 
Budget  0.003 0.151 0.147 0.115 0.132 0.103 0.024 
surplus  (0.07) (6.44)** (6.00)** (4.97)** (5.55)** (3.10)** (0.72) 
Other Controls:         
Investment 0.164 0.293 0.084 0.100 0.051 0.089 0.144 0.233 
ratio (4.16)** (3.17)** (1.84) (2.21)* (1.57) (2.09)* (2.37)** (3.56)* 
Labour force 0.195 0.368 0.301 0.316 0.341 0.311 0.427 0.379 
growth (4.70)** (3.79)** (7.91)** (7.94)** (8.22)** (7.36)** (6.30)** (6.35)** 
Human capital 0.304 -0.380 0.785 0.671 0.963 0.573 1.189 0.111 
growth (0.62) (0.69) (3.10)** (2.77)** (4.15)** (2.19)* (3.24)** (0.31) 
ln(GDP p.c.)t-1 -0.781 -0.521 -4.19 -4.39 -4.40 -4.15 -6.823 -5.808 
 (1.86) (0.82) (6.00)** (6.09)** (7.92)** (6.38)** (5.65)** (5.71)** 
Observations/ 
countries 472/15 447/15 420/15 420/15 416/15 420/15 416/15 422/15 
Log likelihood -709.7 -620.8 -544.9 -536.1 -456.3 -522.8 -457.6 -499.4 
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TABLE 2 Instrumental variable regressions and robustness testing 
Regression No: 
Method: 
[9] 
IV 
[10] 
IV 
[11] 
IV 
[12] 
IV 
[7] 
PMG 
[13] 
PMG 
[14] 
PMG 
[15] 
PMG 
[16] 
PMG 
Tax Rates:        Depend. variable = 
‘Residual growth’  
i,K  0.124  0.076 0.051 -0.060 0.040 -0.007 0.007 
  (3.71)**  (3.09)** (1.79) (2.53)** (1.63) (0.49) (0.47) 
i,L  -0.121  -0.071 -0.028 0.029 -0.038 -0.031 -0.017 
  (3.41)**  (2.30)* (0.93) (1.24)** (1.51) (-2.00)* (1.13) 
Pi-top -0.056 -0.086 -0.051 -0.062 -0.082 -0.037 -0.069 -0.017 -0.010 
 (6.01)* (6.47)** (5.34)** (6.08)** (5.66)** (4.15)** (6.76)** (3.57)** (1.95) 
Ci-stat § -0.024 -0.037 -0.024 -0.029 -0.027 -0.035 -0.022 -0.003 -0.028 
 (2.82)* (3.63)** (2.78)* (3.14)** (1.90) (1.85) (2.94)** (0.42) (2.62)** 
Cj-stat-L 
    
0.013 0.090 
  
0.030 
     (0.77) (5.00)**   (3.08)** 
Cj-stat-H     -0.012 -0.001   -0.002 
     (1.26) (0.13)   (0.39) 
Fiscal Controls:          
Productive 0.125 0.142 0.124 0.118 0.132 0.074 0.118 0.025 -0.016 
expenditure (4.33)** (4.38)** (4.45)** (4.29)** (3.91)** (2.98)** (4.48)** (0.85) (0.56) 
Budget 0.146 0.107 0.185 0.148 0.103 0.141 0.124 0.030 0.012 
surplus (5.12)** (3.17)** (7.38)** (5.64)** (3.10)** (4.60)** (4.62)** (1.43) (0.59) 
Excluded: 
- - Invest Invest 
-ment -ment 
- Lagged 
GDP p.c. 
Foreign 
taxes 
All input 
vars. 
All input 
vars. 
Other Controls? YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES  No No 
Observations/ 
countries 431/15 422/15 431/15 422/15 416/15 416/15 416/15 415/15 415/15 
Log likelihood -587.9 -498.4 -626.0 -552.1 -457.6 -517.2 -481.3 -556.0 -531.9 
§ Instrumenting for Ci-stat by Cj-stat-L, using both distance and GDP as weights. 
Parameters shown are long-run estimates. Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses; * = significant at 5%; ** = 
significant at 1%. Pi-top = top statutory rate of personal income tax; Ci-stat = statutory corporate rate; Cj-stat = 
average statutory corporate tax rates in other countries; Cj-stat-L/H = average statutory tax rates in other countries 
when below/above those in country i. 
Diagnosis tests 
 Regression No.: [0] [10] [11] [12] 
Method: IV IV IV IV 
Sargan test x
2
(1) = 0.060 x
2
(1) = 1.921 x
2
(1) = 0.754 x
2
(2) = 3.627 
p-value 0.81 p-value 0.17 p-value 0.39 p-value 0.16 
Anderson under- x
2
(2) = 313.0 x
2
(2) = 307.9 x
2
(2) = 310.3 x
2
(3) = 314.8 
identification test p-value 0.00 p-value 0.00 p-value 0.00 p-value 0.00 
Weak identification test: 647.4 616.4 426.3 667.1 
Cragg-Donald statistic CV : 19.93 CV : 19.93 CV : 19.93 CV : 22.30 
Instruments for Ci stat are Cj-stat- L, both distance -weighted and GDP-weighted. 
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TABLE 3 Testing effective tax rates 
  
Regression No: 
Method: 
(1) 
PMG 
(2) 
PMG 
(3) 
PMG 
(4) 
PMG 
Tax Rates:     
i,L 0.094 -0.019 0.183 0.247 
 (3.01)** (1.32)** (6.71)** (8.03)** 
Pi-top -0.023 -0.018 -0.022 -0.039 
 (2.34)** (3.45)** (2.73)** (3.51)** 
Corporate tax:     
EMTRi-EATRi   -0.075 -0.126 
   (3.67)** (4.38)** 
EMTRi -0.035   0.003 
 (1.59)   (0.13) 
EMTRj-L 0.078 0.054 0.046 0.043 
 (2.85)** (2.98)** (4.09)** (2.03)* 
EMTRj-H  0.001   
  (0.04)   
Fiscal Controls:     
Productive 0.230 0.084 0.123 0.157 
expenditure (3.78)** (2.75)** (4.21)** (4.49)** 
Budget 0.363 -0.056 0.119 0.182 
surplus (5.92)** (3.64)** (4.23)** (4.19)** 
Other Controls? YES YES YES YES 
Observations/     
countries 
278/12 278/12 278/12 278/12 
Log likelihood -250.20 -245.9 -252.2 -236.3 
Parameters shown are long-run estimates. Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. 
* = significant at 5%; ** = significant at 1%. 
i,L = average MRT labor tax rate. Pi-top = top statutory personal income tax rate. 
EMTRi (EATRi) = Effective marginal (average) corporate tax rate in country i; 
EMTRj-H(-L) = Effective marginal corporate tax rate in country j where j’s EMTR is above (H), or 
below (L), country i’s (distance-weighted). 
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† We are grateful to participants at the Western Economic Association Annual Conference,  
Vancouver, Canada, July 2009, the Victoria University of Wellington, tax conference, Wellington, 
February 2009, and seminar participants at the Universities of Oxford, Oregon and Canterbury. We 
also thank a referee of this Journal, Peren Arin (Massey), Bob Reed (Canterbury) and Joe Stone 
(Oregon), for helpful comments on earlier drafts of the paper. 
1 For example, whether both physical and human capital are required to produce human capital. 
Subsequent endogenous growth models with taxation include Kaas (2003), Kalyvitis (2003), Zagler 
and Durnecker (2003), Park and Philippopoulos (2003), Ho and Wang (2005), and Peretto (2003, 
2007). Barro, et al (1995) and Turnovsky (2004) examine the transitional dynamics of tax-growth 
effects. Futagami et al. (1993) adapt the Barro (1990) model to allow for externalities from public 
capital stocks, rather than public expenditure flows. 
2 See, for example, Martinez-Mongay (2000), Carey and Tchilinguirian (2000), Carey and 
Rabesona (2002), Immervol (2004), de Haan et al. (2004), and McDaniel (2007). 
3 McDaniel (2011) also applies MRT tax rates to aggregate-level tests of labor supply responses. Earlier 
Barro and Sahasakul (1983, 1986) proposed using an income-weighted ‘average marginal tax rate’ 
(AMTR) as a suitable macro-level equivalent of the marginal tax rates normally used to capture 
individuals’ labor supply responses to changes in tax rates. Using this measure, Barro and Redlick 
(2011) find evidence of lower growth in the US in association with higher marginal tax rates. The 
method however is data intensive, requiring annual income distribution data for example, and therefore 
is not readily applied to large panel datasets. 
4 MMA (1997) acknowledge however that, using annual data, they did find some (unreported) 
evidence of statistically significant effects of taxes on GDP growth. They interpret this as evidence of 
transitional growth effects. 
5 In addition, if the 0.2% increase in growth estimated by MMA (1997), albeit with a large margin of 
error, was realized over the long-run – say, from 2.0% p.a. to 2.2% p.a. - GDP would be around 4% 
higher after 20 years, and 6% higher after 30 years. Though not large, these are also not trivial 
improvements over the counterfactual. Gemmell et al. (2011) also caution against considering the 
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growth effects of tax changes without also considering the growth effects of other simultaneous 
changes in expenditures, deficits or other taxes, mandated by the government budget constraint. 
6 Note that G does not enter either firms’ productions functions, nor the household’s utility function. 
7 See MMA (1997) for further discussion of the derivation of these conditions. 
8 Note that, since r*(1 − TF) = RK(1 − TK) − 8, the tax rates on domestic and foreign assets need 
not be equal in equilibrium. However, where fiscal depreciation allowances are set such that r = (RK 
− 8)(1 − TK), then perfect capital mobility ensures that r* = RK − 8 and TF = TK (assuming the 
same consumer preferences and technology across countries). 
9 This system is ‘worldwide’ since all of a resident’s income is taxed domestically regardless of where 
it is earned. It is used in the US and UK, for example. 
10 This is because if (zK > z''), then zK will apply and there is no foreign tax-induced incentive to invest, 
while if zK < z'', then z'' applies, and no investment abroad would occur. 
11 Barro suggests treating K as ‘broad capital’, potentially including human capital. As a result his 
income tax rate is implicitly a uniform rate on both labor and capital income. In an extension to the 
basic model, Barro (1990, p.S117-118) also adds utility-enhancing government spending and a 
consumption tax. 
12 In particular, having established suitable parameter values for the MMA simulations, the technology 
parameter, A, in the Barro production function was selected such that the Barro model yields the same 
growth rate as the MMA model when labor and capital income tax rates equal 20%. 
13 This reflects the model’s properties that as domestic tax rates rise and domestic growth rates 
becomes very low or negative, domestic investment is also very low such that the tax-disincentive to 
investing abroad becomes less relevant. As domestic tax rates approach unity, tax rates on foreign 
income also need to approach unity for equilibrium. 
14 See Blonigen (2005) and de Mooij and Ederveen (2008) for reviews. 
15 Kneller et al (1999) recommend omitting unproductive spending and/or non-distortionary taxes from 
such regressions – since theory suggests these should have little or no growth effect, making 
interpretation of parameters on included fiscal variables easier. 
16 The human capital data is based on Arnold et al (2007). We are grateful to Jens Arnold, Andrea 
Bassanini and Stefano Scarpetta at the OECD for supplying the data. 
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17 The full country sample is: Australia*, Austria*, Canada*, Denmark, Finland*, France*, Germany*, 
Netherlands*, New Zealand, Norway*, Spain*, Sweden*, Turkey, UK*, USA*. Most regressions use 
15 countries; an asterisk indicates the country is included in the reduced 12 country sample when 
effective corporate tax rates are used. For most countries data on tax rate variables are generally 
available till 2009 or 2010 (see Figure 2 and on-line Appendix 3). However effective tax rates data 
(EMTR, EATR) are only available to 2004; regressions therefore generally include data up to 2004. 
This avoids the period of severe macroeconomic disequilibrium and recession from 2008 and allows 
regressions using different tax rate measures to be compared directly. 
18 Indeed Pesaran and Smith (1995) argue that the assumption of homogeneity of the short-run 
parameter estimates across countries is a more serious problem in the DFE estimator than the bias 
generated by the inclusion of lagged dependent variables and can lead to inconsistent and 
misleading results even for large T and large N. 
19 See Pesaran (1997, pp.182-184) for further discussion. 
20 Studies such as Padovano and Galli (2002) for example, estimate ‘aggregate’ marginal tax rates by 
regressing tax revenues on an income measure over a number of years. The resulting parameter is 
then used as a marginal tax rate proxy in cross section/panel growth regressions. 
21 Some data for statutory marginal personal capital income tax rates (e.g. on interest and dividend 
income) are available for OECD countries but coverage is generally limited both across countries and 
annually. OECD (2012) data on top rates of personal tax on dividend income are highly correlated 
(across counties) with top personal rates on earned income. For 2007, for example, personal MTRs on 
dividend and wage income are correlated across our 17 country sample at r = 0.75. Data from Tables 
I.4 & II.4 at www.oecd.org/ctp/taxdatabase.  
22 With 15 countries and around 30 annual observations, we do not have sufficient degrees of freedom 
in our panel regressions to include each ‘foreign’ country’s tax rate separately. 
23 We do not use FDI data due to limited availability for early years of our sample. Physical distance is 
measured by the inverse of distance between the capital cities of all sample countries. This means, for 
example, that for a country such as New Zealand, Australia takes a 95% weight compared to a 5% 
weight for other countries – reflecting the likelihood for New Zealand’s case that flows to/from 
Australia dominate the potential gains/losses from international inflows or outflows. Data on New 
Zealand’s investment in/out-flows suggest this is the case. 
5 4  
24 As with our included foreign tax rate variables, each additional foreign tax rate variable would need 
to be constructed such that values differs across each in-sample country, otherwise it becomes a form 
of country fixed effect. In addition the use of the PMG regression method, which estimates separate 
short-run responses for each variable and country, means that each additional variable included in 
regressions substantially reduces degrees of freedom. 
25 Averages are for 13 or 14 of the sample countries. No data are available for Iceland and Luxembourg 
and the time-series for Turkey is too short. On-line Appendix 3 shows individual country tax rates and 
GDP growth rates. See McDaniel (2007) for derivation of her MRT rates, country-specific results and 
comparisons with the original MRT (1994) measures. 
26 For all regression results we report the homogeneous long-run parameters and omit country-specific, 
short-run parameters to save space. For ‘foreign’ corporate tax rates, distance-weighted statutory rates 
are reported. 
27 Note that the parameter on ln(GDP p.c.)t-1 cannot be interpreted as a ‘rate of convergence’ as is 
common in long-run growth regressions, since the dependent variable is the change in aggregate 
GDP, and all regressions also include an ‘error correction’ term capturing the short-run annual 
adjustment of GDP to equilibrium. This short-run effect might be expected to pick up mainly 
demand-induced deviations from equilibrium, whereas long-run convergence is more associated with 
longer-term supply-side adjustments. 
28 The models described in section 2 assume that fiscal effects on GDP are transmitted through private 
investment or human capital accumulation such that, arguably, these variables should not be included 
as ‘controls’ in our regressions if the full fiscal impact is to be identified. We investigate this aspect 
further in sub-section 4.5. 
29 See Gemmell et al (2011) for further discussion of, and evidence on, this timing/persistence aspect. 
30 IV diagnostics shown below Table 2 support the instruments chosen. We also examine IV 
regressions in which we instrument additionally for the MRT tax rates (using ‘low tax’ countries 
weighted MTR rates as instruments), other fiscal variables and investment. Since the only additional 
instruments available for other fiscal variables and investment are the 3
rd
/4
th
 lagged (predetermined) 
values, we do not place a great deal of weight on these results. Nevertheless, the parameters and 
statistical significance of our various tax rate measures remain similar to those given in Tables 1 & 2. 
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31 This is confirmed when we replace GDP growth with the investment rate as our dependent variable. 
In this case, unlike MMA (1997), we find no significant effects of our tax rates on investment – though 
we would caution that such regressions are somewhat ad hoc in specification and are not derived from a 
fully-specified model of the determinants of investment. 
32 This evidence is consistent with Romer and Romer (2010) who found, using VAR methods, that 
strong negative impacts of income tax rates on US GDP estimated for up to 5 years, appeared to persist 
beyond this period. 
33 Table 3 reports regressions for the case of assumed uniform inflation rates across countries. Other 
assumptions are: investment is in plant and machinery, financed by equity or retained earnings, 
taxation at shareholder level is not included, rate of economic rent = 10% (i.e. financial return = 
20%), real discount rate = 10%, inflation rate = 3.5%, depreciation rate = 12.25%; see Devereux and 
Griffith (2003) for details. We also obtained results using ETRs calculated using each country’s own 
inflation rate; results are similar. 
34 In this sample the EATRs and EMTRs are highly correlated overall: r = 0.90 to 0.98 (for the 3 
weighting cases) across the 12 OECD countries. 
35 The parameter estimates on (EMTRi – EATRi) in (3) and (4) imply that raising the EATR, whilst 
holding the EMTR constant, has a positive association with GDP growth. We interpret this as an 
income effect from the implicit inframarginal increase in depreciation deductions associated with 
the EATR rise. 
36 Ideally, a structural model that sought to model both tax and non-tax determinants of our controls 
variables could be used. While such components of such a model are increasingly being pursued at 
the micro level – e.g. estimating tax impacts within investment equations – it is because of difficulties 
fully specifying and estimating such structural models at the aggregate level that the reduced forms 
used here have been commonplace in recent literature. 
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